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I. INTRODUCTION
As we observed the Fiftieth Anniversary of the adoption of the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights by the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions, it was fitting to commemorate this historic event and to assess the pro-
gress that had been made in achieving the fundamental principles of human
rights and freedoms. Upon its adoption on December 10, 1948, it was hailed
"as a common standard of achievement for all peoples of all nations."'
High hopes were expressed that this Declaration would soon become a
new Magna Carta of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all people
throughout the world.2 Notwithstanding some unfulfilled expectations, one
must view, with great satisfaction, the emergence of human rights awareness
and an international law of human rights. This body of human rights law,
which deals with the promotion and protection of human rights, owes much
to the Declaration and the United Nations Human Rights system that devel-
oped.3 Indeed, at the United Nations Conference on Human Rights in 1993,
more than one hundred nations reaffirmed "their commitment to the pur-
poses and principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights."4
1. General Assembly Adopts Declaration of Human Rights: Statement by Mrs. Franklin
D. Roosevelt, U.S. Representative to the General Assembly, Dec. 9, 1948, DEP'T ST. BULL.,
Dec. 19, 1948, at 751 [hereinafter Roosevelt Address (Dec.)]; Human Rights, 5 WHITEMAN
DIGEST § 13, at 243. See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III),
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc A/8 10 (1948), reprinted in JACK DONNELLY,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 165 (1993) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]; The Third
Regular Session of the General Assembly, Paris: No Compromise on Essential Freedoms,
Address by Secretary Marshall, Sep. 23, 1948, DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 3, 1948, at 432 (urging
General Assembly to approve Declaration of Human Rights as standard of conduct for all).
2. Roosevelt Address (Dec), supra note 1, at 751.
3. See Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Na-
tional and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 287, 290-91 (1996) (citing Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on Human Rights, 22d plen. mtg.,
pmbl. IT 3, 8 at 20-46, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/24 (1993), reprinted in 32 1.L.M. 1661). For
other valuable sources regarding the international law of human rights, see generally
NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS (2d
ed. 1996); HENRY J. STEINER & PHnIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT:
LAW, POLITICS, MORALS (1996).
4. Hannum, supra note 3, at 290 (quoting Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,
World Conference on Human Rights, 22d plen. mtg., pmbl. 3, 8 at 20-46, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 157/24 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1661).
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II. MORAL NORMS AND LEGAL RIGHTS
Although this article deals with the United Nations' Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights and international law, one primary concern is the role
of domestic courts in the enforcement of those human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms as legal rights. The literature of human history is replete with
discussions of idealistic moral norms and utopian societies. Are the ideals
collectively described as "human rights" merely moral norms, or are they en-
forceable legal rights?5 This article, therefore, does not deal merely with
human rights as moral or ethical norms; rather, it addresses legally enforce-
able rights to be enjoyed by the human family. Hence, the author is not lim-
ited to the existence of substantive rights set forth in a declaration of human
rights, but also extend to effective remedies to vindicate violations of those
rights.
Predicated on theological, philosophical and sociological foundations,
various theories have been expounded for the existence of human rights.6
Without minimizing prior efforts to affirm and set forth the human rights of
the individual,7 the turning point for effective promotion and observance of
human rights was the Charter of the United Nations.8 The Charter of the
United Nations not only paved the way for the adoption of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the Covenant on Political and Civil Rights,
and the Covenant on Social and Economic Rights, but it also succeeded in
establishing a new international juridical order.9 This new international order
altered the sovereign status of nation-states and their responsibilities to the
individual. "
As a result of the unprecedented concern for human rights, nations were
obliged to acknowledge the inherent dignity of the individual and fundamen-
tal human rights. The unfettered sovereignty of states was irrevocably
eroded, and the duty of states to promote and observe human rights was sol-
emnly proclaimedl-no longer were sovereign states the sole subjects of in-
ternational law and the individual merely an "object."' 2 The unspeakable
5. Id.
6. See NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 3, at 2.
7. See prior declarations and statements in Edward D. Re, Freedom in the International
Society, in CONCEPT OF FREEDOM 217 (Rev. Carl W. Grindel, C.M., Ph.D. ed., 1955) [herein-
after Re, Freedom]. See generally EDWARD LAWSON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN RIGHTS
(Mary Lou Bertucci ed., 2d ed. 1991); Louis HENKIN, TiE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990); BRENDAN
F. BROWN, TiE NATURAL LAW READER (1960); NORMAN BENTWICH, THE RELIGIOUS
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONALISM (1933).
8. NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 3, at 7.
9. LAWSON, supra note 7, at 710-11.
10. Id.
11. See W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary Interna-
tional Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866, 869 (1990), reprinted in HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP
ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 157-60
(1996).
12. Re, Freedom, supra note 7, at 224.
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atrocities and gross human rights violations of the World War II era high-
lighted a new responsibility of the world community to respect, promote and
protect the fundamental human rights of the individual. 13 Addressing the Fif-
tieth General Assembly of the United Nations in 1995, Pope John Paul II
noted the "outrages against human dignity" led the United Nations to formu-
late, "barely three years after its establishment, that Universal Declaration of
Human Rights[, which remains one of the highest expressions of the human
conscience of our time."' 4
It must be stressed that the very notion of the existence of human rights
of individuals necessarily implies a restriction or limitation upon the sover-
eign power of states and governments.' 5 The American Declaration of Inde-
pendence, after proclaiming as self-evident certain "unalienable rights," de-
clared that governments must be instituted to "secure these Rights."' 6 For the
United States, therefore, to protect or guarantee fundamental human rights is
to be faithful to its founding document and the Bill of Rights of the Constitu-
tion, which gives legal status to the moral rights proclaimed in the Declara-
tion of Independence. Much of this American political philosophy undoubt-
edly influenced the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.'7
Regardless of the underlying philosophical or theoretical basis, no na-
tion today may claim a sovereign right to violate those fundamental and un-
alienable universal rights.' 8 The founding of the United Nations resulted in
the establishment of a new international legal environment where human
rights assumed unprecedented importance. Our present efforts, therefore, are
not merely to proclaim or assert the existence of fundamental fights and
13. LAWSON, supra note 7, at 710.
14. Pope John Paul I1, Address at the Fiftieth General Assembly of the United Nations
Organization (Oct. 5, 1995) (emphasis added). See also Redemptor Hominis, in THE
ENCYCLICALS OF JOHN PAUL II §§ 17.4 & 17.5, at 75-76 (J. Michael Muller, C.S.B. ed., 1996)
(outlining the Declaration of Human Rights); Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, in id. § 26.2, at 447
(noting the increased awareness of respect for human rights).
15. See Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) (acknowl-
edging the "jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and ab-
solute"); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that a sovereign's
treatment of its own citizens is a matter of international concern under the United Nations
Charter). See also Joseph Diab, Note, United States Ratification of the American Convention
on Human Rights, 2 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 323, 336 (1992) ("The principle of noninter-
ference in domestic affairs does not shield states from scrutiny or censure should they torture,
murder, or arbitrarily imprison their citizens.").
16. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). When a government is
guilty of destroying "certain unalienable Rights ... it is the Right of the People to alter or
abolish it, and to institute [a] new Government." Id.
17. See Universal Declaration, supra note 1. See also Louis Henkin, Rights: American
and Human, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 405, 415 (1979) (noting similarities and differences between
American and Human rights) [hereinafter American and Human]. "[M]ost of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and later the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, are in their essence American constitutional rights projected around the world." Id.
18. See Siderman de Blake v. Rep. of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1992); Filartiga,
630 F.2d at 884 (noting that no contemporary state asserts "a right to torture its own or an-
other nation's citizens").
4
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freedoms to which human beings are entitled; rather, efforts must be dedi-
cated to strengthening the legal enforcement institutions and mechanisms
that must exist to give these rights vitality as enforceable legal rights.
III. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The Charter of the United Nations contains seven provisions that ex-
pressly refer to human rights. 9 Article 55 specifically provides for promo-
tion of "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and funda-
mental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion."' The Charter, however, does not include an International Bill of
Rights or Charter of Human Rights. 21 Nevertheless, it was clear that interna-
tional human rights were a subject of major concern and that, henceforth,
fundamental human rights were to be recognized as legal rights enforceable
under international law. 22
A. Approval of Declaration by General Assembly
The task of drafting an International Bill of Rights was assigned to the
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, which established the
Commission on Human Rights on June 21, 1946.23 The Commission decided
that the Bill of Rights would contain two parts. The first part would be a
Declaration that could be approved through the action of the Member States
of the United Nations in the General Assembly.2 ' In the words of the Com-
mission, this Declaration would have great moral force because, in effect, it
would say to the peoples of the world "this is what we hope human rights
may mean to all peoples in the years to come." 26
The second part of the Bill of Rights would be a covenant in the form of
a treaty to be presented to the nations of the world for adoption and ratifica-
tion.27 This covenant, once ratified or adopted by a nation, would have the
status of a legally binding treaty. Hence, the signatory nations would, if nec-
essary, be obligated to alter or modify their national laws if they did not con-
form to the provisions or standards established in the covenant.28
19. U.N. CHARTER pmbl., arts. 1, 13, 55, 62, 68, 76.
20. Id. art. 55, para. C.
21. See generally id.
22. See Re, Freedom, supra note 7, at 243.
23. The Struggle for Human Rights: Address by Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.S. Repre-
sentative to the Commission on Human Rights, Sept. 28, 1948, DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 10,
1948, at 457 (hereinafter Roosevelt Address (Oct.)].
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. (emphasis added).
27. Id.
28. Id.
2003]
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The United Nations Commission on Human Rights presented the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights to the General Assembly in 1948 at a
meeting in Paris.29 The declaration was overwhelmingly approved on De-
cember 10, 1948,30 a date worthy of celebration throughout the world as
Human Rights Day.
B. Nature and Content of the Declaration
Although past declarations of rights were usually enacted to remedy
specific abuses or grievances, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
was the first all-embracing official codification of human rights. It encom-
passed a broad range of human rights and was the first concrete step to ful-
filling the Charter's pledge to promote "universal respect for, and obser-
vance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction
as to race, sex, language, or religion." 31
The Declaration, which contained a preamble and thirty articles, was not
limited to the basic civil and political rights that characterize the American
Bill of Rights. 32 For example, in addition to certain miscellaneous provi-
sions, such as the right of asylum, the Declaration included economic and
social rights, such as the right to work and the right to education. 33 The im-
portance of the Declaration cannot be minimized because, for the first time
in history, there was agreement in the international community on the basic
human rights of the individual. The animating principle of the Declaration is
articulated in the opening phrase of its preamble, which proclaims: "the in-
herent dignity and ... equal and inalienable rights of all members of the
human family are the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the
world."'34
The thirty articles of the Declaration proclaimed: the right to life, liberty
and security of person; freedom from slavery, torture, cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment; freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention or
exile; the right to equality before the law; the right to a fair and public hear-
ing by an independent and impartial tribunal, and, a presumption of inno-
cence; the right to protection against ex post facto laws; and the right of asy-
lum from persecution. 5 The articles also provided for: freedom from
arbitrary interference with one's privacy, family, home or correspondence;
freedom to leave any country; freedom of movement and residence; freedom
of religion, expression, assembly and association; the right of people to have
their will serve as the basis of the authority of Government; the right to work
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. U.N. CHARTER art. 55(c) (emphasis added).
32. See generally Universal Declaration, supra note 1.
33. Id. arts. 14, 22, 23, 26.
34. Id. pmbl. (emphasis added).
35. Id. arts. 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 14.
6
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and join trade unions; the right to own property; the right to rest and leisure;
the right to social security; the right to education; the right to participate in
the cultural life of the community; equal rights as to marriage; and freedom
from discrimination.
36
The following sections illustrate the moral moorings of the Declaration:
Article I proclaimed:
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another
in a spirit of brotherhood.37
Article 2 proscribed discrimination by declaring:
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declara-
tion, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth
or other status.
38
Article 3 declared:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
39
Article 18 explained freedom of worship in the following terms:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.
40
In light of the vastness of the "rights and freedoms" proclaimed in the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, its adoption was a phenomenal
achievement-a common standard of achievement by nations representing
the greater portion of the world's population. Indeed, not one country ven-
tured to cast a negative vote.
36. Id. arts. 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26.
37, Id. art. 1.
38. Id. art. 2. Article 7, which also addresses equal protection, states: "All are equal be-
fore the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law." Id.
art. 7.
39. id. art. 3.
40. Id. art. 18.
2003]
7
Re: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Effective Remedies and
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2003
144 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33
IV. MORAL AND LEGAL EFFECT OF THE DECLARATION AND REGIONAL
CHARTERS
The Declaration is not an international covenant or treaty. As stated by
Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, the Chair of the Commission on Human Rights and
the United States Representative to the General Assembly:
It is not and does not purport to be a statement of law or a legal obligation.
It is a declaration of basic principles of human rights and freedoms, to be
stamped with the approval of the General Assembly by formal vote of its
members, and to serve as a common standard of achievement for all Peo-
ples of all nations. 41
Although not a legally binding treaty, the Declaration is an "authorita-
tive interpretation" of the human rights provisions of the Charter and serves
to awaken the world to a human rights conscience.4 2 It was no longer ques-
tionable whether international protection is granted to all individuals: the in-
ternational community would no longer tolerate gross human rights abuses
or discrimination on account of "race, colour, sex, language, [or] religion. '43
It must be noted that efforts to draft broad charters of human liberties
have not been limited to the United Nations. Various important Regional
Charters supplemented the efforts of the United Nations to promote respect
and observance of human rights. Regional systems, such as the European
system for the protection of human rights beginning with the Statute of the
Council of Europe in 1949;4' the Inter-American system which began with
the Organization of American States in 1948;45 and the African system
which started with the Organization of African Unity in 1963,46 are beyond
the scope of this article. More recent initiatives, which manifest the firm
determination of the international community to punish persons guilty of
gross human rights violations, are also beyond the scope of this article. Ex-
amples of those initiatives, however, include the International Criminal
Court4 7 and the establishment of International Criminal Tribunals for
Rwanda48 and the former Yugoslavia.49
41. Roosevelt Address (Dec.), supra note 1, at 751.
42. L'Osservatore Ramano, The Church and the Rights of Man (Apr. 11, 1968), at
http://www.ewtn.com/library/HUMANITY/rightsmn.htm (last visited May 16, 2003) (on file
with California Western International Law Journal).
43. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 2.
44. Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, 87 U.N.T.S. 103.
45. Charter of the Organization of American States, entered into force Dec. 13, 1951,
119 U.N.T.S. 3.
46. Charter of the Organization for African Unity, entered into force May 25, 1963, 479
U.N.T.S. 39.
47. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998).
48. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/955 (1994) (establishing
Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal).
49. U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) (establishing
8
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Any treatment of international human rights must also refer to the
enormous contribution of non-government organizations in the field of hu-
man rights. These organizations focus attention on human rights abuses
throughout the world and work to achieve remedial action. A few that de-
serve mention include Amnesty International," the International League for
Human Rights,5' the International Commission of Jurists,5 2 the Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights53 and Human Rights Watch. 4
V. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Many of the fundamental human rights enunciated in the Declaration
are embraced in modem international law and form the basis of international
human rights standards.5 Indeed, virtually all international instruments and
treaties dealing with human rights invoke provisions of the Declaration, a
primary source of international human rights law.
For Americans and others interested in the legal system of the United
States, it is important to know that international law is part of the law of the
land. Almost a century ago, in the classic case of The Paquette Habana,56
Justice Gray stated: "International law is part of our law, and must be ascer-
tained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as
often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their de-
termination."57 The question to be resolved by American courts today is the
specific applicability of that famous statement.
Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal).
50. See generally Amnesty International at http://www.amnesty.org. (last visited May
16, 2003). Amnesty International envisions "a world in which every person enjoys all of the
human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international
human rights standards." Id.
51. See generally International Leauge for Human Rights, at http://www.ilhr.org (last
visited May 16, 2003). The goal of the International Leauge for Human Rights is to "keep
human rights at the forefront of international affairs and to give meaning and effect to the
human rights values enshrined in international human rights treaties and conventions." Id.
52. See generally International Commission of Jurists, available at http://www.icj.org
(last visited May 16, 2003).
53. See generally Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, at http://www.lchr.org (last vis-
ited May 16, 2003). The "Lawyers Committee for Human Rights has worked in the U.S. and
abroad to create a secure and humane world by advancing justice, human dignity and respect
for the rule of law." Id.
54. See generally Human Rights Watch, at http://www.hrw.org (last visited May 16,
2003). Human Rights Watch stands "with victims and activists to prevent discrimination, to
uphold political freedom, to protect people from inhumane conduct in wartime, and to bring
offenders to justice." Id.
55. See generally American and Human, supra note 17; BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL
RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS (1996).
56. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
57. Id. at 700. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Article VI states, in pertinent part: "[A]II
Treaties made... under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land .. " Id. Justice Gray's statement followed a tradition reflected in William Blackstone,
who, relying on judicial precedent, wrote that the "law of nations ... is here adopted in its full
2003]
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Addressing the American Society of International Law, Justice Harry
Blackmun spoke of "the Supreme Court, the law of nations and the place in
American jurisprudence for what the Drafters of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence termed, a 'decent respect to the opinions of mankind."' 58 He ob-
served that:
The early architects of our nation were experienced diplomats who appre-
ciated that the law of nations was binding on the United States. John Jay,
the first Chief Justice of the United States, observed, in a case called Chi-
solm v. Georgia that the United States "had, by taking a place among the
nations of the earth, become amenable to the laws of nations." Although
the Constitution [through art. I, § 8, cl. 10] gives Congress the power to
"define and punish . . . [o]ffenses against the Law of Nations," and
[through art. VI, cl. 2] identifies treaties of "the supreme Law of the
Land," the task of further defining the role of international law in the na-
tion's legal fabric has fallen to the courts.
59
After indicating that "[sieveral first principles have been established,"
Justice Blackmun stated:
As early as 1804, the Supreme Court recognized that "an act of congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other pos-
sible construction remains." In a trilogy of cases in the 1880s, the Court
established that treaties are on equal footing with federal statutes and that,
where a treaty and statute cannot be reconciled, the later in time is control-
ling.6
0
In discussing the case of The Paquette Habana, Justice Blackmun noted
that:
[T]he Supreme Court addressed the power of courts to enforce customary
international law. In invalidating the wartime seizure of fishing vessels as
contrary to the law of nations, the Court observed: "lhternational law is
part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts."
extent by the common law, and is held to be a part of the law of the land." 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 67 (1st ed. 1765-69). See generally
CHARLES PERGLER, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
§ 1, at 1 (1928) (reaffirming "[i]nternational law as part of the common law"); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111(1) (1987) ("International law and international
agreements of the United States are law of the United States and supreme over the law of the
several States."); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 877-78 (pointing to U.S. adoption of laws of nations).
See generally JORDAN I. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1996).
58. Harry Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations: Owing a Decent Re-
spect to the Opinions of Mankind, AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. NEWSLETTER, Mar.-May 1994, at 383.
59. Id. (emphasis added and citations omitted).
60. Id. (emphasis added and citations omitted). The "law of nations" has been supplanted
by the current usage "international law." RESTATEMENT, supra note 57, pt. 1, ch. I (Introduc-
tory Note).
10
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Where no treaty or other legal authority is controlling, resort must be had
to the customs of nations.
61
Thus, Justice Blackmun asserted that "[t]hese early principles, estab-
lished during the Supreme Court's first century, continue to define the rela-
tionship between the law of nations and domestic American law. '62 Having
introduced his subject, Justice Blackmun stated that he wished to consider
"the Supreme Court's application of these principles in four of the Court's
recent cases. 63 Accordingly, a word about each of these cases' here will be
useful.
In 1991, the Court held in United States v. Alvarez-Machain65 that the
forced abduction of a Mexican national by United States agents did not vio-
late a United States-Mexico extradition treaty.66 In Alvarez-Machain, Dr.
Alvarez was kidnapped in Mexico and brought to the United States to stand
trial for murder. As one of three dissenting judges, Justice Blackmun stated
that "transborder kidnapping" violated the very "spirit and purpose" of the
exradition treaty, which was to "preserve the territorial integrity of nations,
protect individuals from arbitrary detention and arrest, and prevent interna-
tional conflict. '67 In the 1993 decision of Haitian Centers Council v.
McNary,68 Justice Blackmun again dissented from the Court's opinion to up-
hold a United States policy of "intercepting Haiti refugees on the high seas
and summarily returning them to Haiti."69 According to Justice Blackmun,
such a ruling failed to respect the United Nations Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees by allowing "vulnerable" refugees to be returned to a
place of persecution.7"
The two other cases, Thompson v. Oklahoma71 and Stanford v. Ken-
tucky,72 challenged the execution of juvenile offenders. In Thompson, a plu-
rality opinion, the Court held that, "'civilized standards of decency' embod-
61. Blackmun, supra note 58, at 383-84. (emphasis added and citations omitted).
62. Id. at 384.
63. Id.
64. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (examining United
States-Mexico extradition treaty); Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir.
1992), rev'd sub nom. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 159 (1993) (discussing the
validity of executive action in light of binding international treaties); Stanford v. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361, 389 (1989) (considering the relevance of legislation of other countries to the
Eight Amendment analysis); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (considering im-
plications of international law on Eighth Amendment death penalty jurisprudence).
65. 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
66. Id. at 669-70.
67. Blackmun, supra note 58, at 384.
68. 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S.
155 (1993).
69. Blackmun, supra note 58, at 385.
70. Sale, 509 U.S. at 190.
71. 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion).
72. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
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ied in the Eighth Amendment prohibited" the use of the death penalty
against the defendant.73 By following the standards of other countries that
had outlawed juvenile capital punishment, the majority arrived at a decision
"consistent with international practice."74 In Stanford, however, the majority
held that, regardless of the United States' ratification of an international
treaty explicitly prohibiting juvenile death penalties, the execution of the ju-
venile defendant was constitutionally valid.75 Justice Scalia distinguished
Stanford from Thompson by "emphasiz[ing] that it is American conceptions
of decency that are dispositive, [and] reject[ing] the contention ... that the
sentencing practices of other countries are relevant."76 Justice Brennan's dis-
sent in Stanford noted: "Within the world community, the imposition of the
death penalty for juvenile crimes appears to be overwhelmingly disap-
proved."77 Referring to the four cases above, Justice Blackmun observed that
unfortunately, "the Supreme Court has shown something less than 'a decent
respect to the opinions of mankind."' 78
VI. HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The four cases mentioned above dealt with the role and applicability of
international law in U.S. courts, specifically, the United States Supreme
Court. In 1993, the Court decided, Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 79 a case that
tested the tension between human rights and sovereign immunity. Nelson
dealt with the interpretation of the United States Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act of 1976 (FSIA)8° as applied to an American plaintiff who was alleg-
edly tortured by a sovereign. Beyond mere interpretation of a domestic stat-
ute dealing with the immunity of a foreign sovereign, Nelson revealed the
extent to which courts are willing to give effect to international legal norms.
73. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830.
74. Id.
75. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.
76. Id. at 369 n. 1 (emphasis in original). "While the practices of other nations, particu-
larly other democracies, can be relevant to determining whether a practice uniform among our
people is not merely a historical accident, . . . they cannot serve to establish the first Eighth
Amendment prerequisite, that the practice is accepted among our people." Id. (citations and
quotations omitted).
77. Id. at 390 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Blackmun, supra note 58, at 387. An
Amnesty International report indicated that "the United States 'stands almost alone in the
world in executing offenders who were under 18 at the time of the crime."' Id.
78. Blackmun, supra note 58, at 384. See also Louis Henkin, A Decent Respect to the
Opinions of Mankind, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 215, 229 (1992); Jennie Hatfield-Lyon, Nel-
son v. Saudi Arabia: An Opportunity for Judicial Enforcement of International Human Rights
Standards, 86 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 331 passim (1992).
79. 507 U.S. 349 (1993). See generally Edward D. Re, Human Rights, International Law,
and Domestic Courts, 4 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 6-12 (1996) (discussing the Nelson
case).
80. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (2000) [hereinafter FSIA].
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The facts of Nelson are clear. One may speak of "the facts" because de-
fendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and therefore, for pur-
poses of the motion, the facts alleged by Nelson were deemed true." While
in the United States, plaintiff Scott Nelson saw a printed advertisement re-
cruiting employees for the King Faisal Specialist Hospital in Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia. The Hospital Corporation of America (HCA), under contract with
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, conducted recruitment of American employ-
ees for the hospital in the United States.82 Nelson was selected to interview
with hospital officials in Saudi Arabia. After returning to the United States,
and pursuant to a contract of employment with the hospital executed in Mi-
ami, Florida, Nelson was hired as a monitoring systems engineer. 83
Under the hospital's job description, Nelson was responsible for "moni-
toring all 'facilities, equipment, utilities and maintenance systems to insure
the safety of patients, hospital staff and others."' 84 Nelson's difficulties be-
gan when, while performing his duties, he discovered various safety hazards
at the hospital. After he reported the safety hazards to an investigative com-
mission of the Saudi government, Nelson was summoned to the hospital's
security office. Nelson alleged that he was subsequently taken to a jail cell
where he was "shackled, tortured, and beaten" by Saudi government
agents.85
After Nelson's release and return to the United States, he sued Saudi
Arabia, the hospital, and the hospital's purchasing agent in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida, claiming that United
States courts had subject matter jurisdiction under FSIA.86 Aside from seven
exceptions, FSIA provided foreign states with immunity from suit in United
States courts.87 One exception provided that a "foreign state shall not be im-
mune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in
any case ... in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried
on in the United States by the foreign state ... "88
The district court concluded that "the link between recruitment activities
and the Defendants was not sufficient to establish 'substantial contact' with
the United States" within the meaning of the commercial activity exception
of the FSIA.89 It, therefore, granted Saudi Arabia's motion for dismissal for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.9'
81. Nelson v. Saudia Arabia, No. 88-1791-CIV-NESBITT, 1989 WL 435302, at *1 (S.D.
Fla. Aug. 11, 1989).
82. See Nelson, 507 U.S. at 351-52 (describing the method of hiring by the HCA).
83. See Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528, 1530 (1lth Cir. 1991) (explaining the
hiring process in employing Nelson).
84. See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. at 352 (describing Nelson's duties).
85. See id. at 352-53 (detailing treatment Nelson received after reporting violations).
86. Nelson, 1989 WL 435302, at *2.
87. See FSIA, supra note 80.
88. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2000).
89. See Nelson, 923 F.2d at 1530 (quoting Nelson, 1989 WL 435302, at *2).
90. Id.
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The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that
"the recruitment and hiring of Nelson in the United States was a 'commer-
cial activity' of the Saudi government"91 having "substantial contact with the
United States."92 The recruitment was conducted in the United States by the
HCA, who contracted with the Royal Cabinet of the Kingdom of Saudi Ara-
bia to recruit employees for the hospital in 1973. The Court of Appeals
agreed with Nelson that the recruitment and hiring in United States consti-
tuted a commercial activity, and that a "jurisdictional nexus" existed be-
tween the acts for which damages were sought and the foreign sovereign's
commercial activity. 93 The court concluded: "the detention and torture of
Nelson are so intertwined with his employment at the HCA that they are
'based upon' his recruitment and hiring, in the United States, for employ-
ment at the Hospital in Saudi Arabia." 94 The Court of Appeals held that Nel-
son's alleged torture was directly attributable to the performance of his du-
ties under the contract for employment made in the United States, and that
the court had jurisdiction.9
The Department of State joined the defendants in urging a reconsidera-
tion en banc. The Court of Appeals denied the request and the Executive
Branch joined the defendants in their petition for writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court. Even before the Court granted of the petition, the case gen-
erated considerable media interest.96 The Supreme Court reversed and dis-
missed Nelson in its entirety.97 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas joined Justice Souter's opinion and reversed
on the ground that Nelson's suit was not based on a commercial activity. 98
Justice White's concurring opinion indicated that Saudi Arabia was en-
gaged in a commercial activity because it was "self-evident" 99 that the
"state-owned hospital was engaged in ordinary commercial business."' 00 In
"getting even" with a whistle blower, it did not matter whether the sovereign
resorted to "thugs or government officers to carry on its business."'0 ' Never-
theless, Justice White concurred in the majority's reversal because, in his
91. Id. at 1536 (reversing district court's ruling).
92. Id. at 1533.
93. Id. at 1530.
94. Id. at 1535.
95. Id.
96. See Pete Yost, U.S. Sides Against American in Lawsuit Over Saudi Actions,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, May 25, 1993, at 3A; Thomas W. Lippman, Workers' Tales of Tor-
ture Strain U.S.-Saudi Ties, WASH. POST, May 24, 1992, at A8; Norman Kempster, Panel to
Hear Charges of Saudi Torture, L.A. TIMEs, May 13, 1992, at A6; Neil A. Lewis, After the
War: U.S. Wants Saudi Torture Suit Settled, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1991, at 11.
97. See Nelson, 507 U.S. at 363.
98. See id. at 358 n.4.
99. Id. at 365 (White, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 369 (White, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 368.
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view, the commercial activity in Saudi Arabia, "though constituting the basis
of the Nelsons' suit, lack[ed] a sufficient nexus to the United States.' 12
Justices Blackmun and Kennedy dissented in part and voted to remand
the case on the "failure to warn" claims set forth in the Nelson complaint.
1 3
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, stated that the
counts of failure to warn of foreseeable dangers were "based upon commer-
cial activity having substantial contact with the United States," because
"they complain of a negligent omission made during the recruiting of a hos-
pital employee in the United States."''
4
Justice Stevens' dissent stated that:
[Saudi Arabia's] commercial activities ... have sufficient contact with the
United States to justify the exercise of federal jurisdiction .... The posi-
tion for which [Nelson] was recruited and ultimately hired was that of a
monitoring systems manager, a troubleshooter, and, taking [Nelson's] al-
legations as true, it was precisely [his] performance of those responsibili-
ties that led to the hospital's retaliatory actions against him.... If the
same activities had been performed by a private business, I have no doubtjurisdiction would be upheld. And that, of course, should be a touchstone
of our inquiry. 1
05
Following the 1991 decision of the Court of Appeals in Nelson, the Ju-
diciary Committee of the United States House of Representatives sought to
expand the circumstances under which an American may sue by proposing
certain amendments to the FSIA. One amendment would grant United States
courts jurisdiction over any case in which money damages are sought against
a foreign state for personal injury or death of a United States citizen occur-
ring in such foreign state, and caused by torture or extra-judicial killing of
that citizen by such foreign state, or by an official or employee of such for-
eign state while acting within the scope of his or her office or employ-
ment.106
The Committee Report stated, "[iun recent years, several U.S. citizens
have been tortured abroad and have faced difficulties in obtaining a rem-
edy."' 07 It noted that in Nelson, the State Department intervened on behalf of
102. Id. at 370.
103. Id. at 376.
104. Id. at 371 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
105. Id. at 378-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. See H.R. REP. No. 102-900, at 1-2 (1992). The proposed amendments contained in
H.R. REP. No. 102-900 were intended to supplement and supersede a bill that was introduced
in the House of Representatives more than two years prior to the Nelson ruling to amend §
1605(a) of the FSIA. The essential difference between the original bill and the Committee
Report is that the Committee Report specifically deals with "torture or extrajudicial killing."
H.R. REP. No. 102-900, at I. See also Edward D. Re, Human Rights, Domestic Courts and
Effective Remedies, 67 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 581, 588-92 (1993) (reviewing subcommittee hear-
ing on House Bill 2357).
107. H.R. REP. No. 102-900, at 3. For human rights practices, including human rights
abuses, see generally Lorne W. Craner, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
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Saudi Arabia, and that the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1992 (TVPA)1'°
might not be an effective remedy."0 9 Indeed, the TVPA was inadequate be-
cause it only provided for suit against the individual torturer and not the for-
eign state."0 Hence, the Committee Report addressed the expansion of the
circumstances under which an American subjected to torture by a foreign
state could sue in United States courts."'
Although the proposed amendment was ultimately rejected, Congress
enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act in 1996
(AEDPA), which amended Section 1605(a) of FSIA. 112 The amendments
provided that:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States ... in which money damages are sought against a foreign
state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, ex-
trajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of
material support or resources ... for such an act if such act or provision of
material support is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such
2001, 24 DEF. INST. OF SEC. ASST. MGMT. J. 4655 (2002), at http://disam.osd.mil/
pubs/INDEXES/journals/24-4/Journa24-4.htm (on file with California Western International
Law Journal), prepared by the Department of State in accordance with §§ 116(d) and 502(b)
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and § 504 of the Trade Assistance Act of 1974. The
report was submitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate. Id.
108. See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(1992). "An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign
nation ... subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that
individual .. ." Id. See also Kadi6 v. Karad&ic, 70 F.3d 232, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. de-
nied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996) (considering action against former Bosnian Serb leader indicted
by International Criminal Tribunal for various international crimes). Defendant was served in
New York and was sued in federal court under the Alien Tort Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2002)
and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991. See also Jordan J. Paust, Suing Karadii , 10
LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 91 (1997).
109. H.R. REP. No. 102-900, at 4 (stating that the Torture Victim Protection Act will not
be available to all U.S. citizens tortured abroad if personal jurisdiction over torturer does not
exist).
110. See Torture Victim Protection Act § 2.
111. See H.R. REP. No. 102-900, at 4-5. The Committee expressed the view that the U.S.
had abdicated its:
moral responsibility to provide leadership in the area of human rights by undertak-
ing efforts to extend the scope of international laws protecting those rights....
[An action constituting a violation of settled international law-in this case tor-
ture or extrajudicial killing-is no more acceptable when committed by a foreign
government than by anyone else.
id. at 4. See also Keith Highet et al., Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act-Commercial Activity
Exception-Nature and Purpose Tests-Police Power as Sovereign Power, 87 AM. J. INT'L L.
442, 444 (1993) (noting their "disappoint[ment] that the Court failed to use [the Nelson] case
as a vehicle for providing a remedy in the U.S. courts for intentional torts committed by for-
eign states in their own territory").
112. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§221(a), 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(7)).
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foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employ-
ment, or agency ....113
This new "anti-terrorism" exception to FSIA, however, permitted
American citizens to sue a foreign state only if the defendant state is on the
State Department's "terrorism list.-1 14 Nevertheless, because the "anti-
terrorism" exception gave rise to new litigation, it might bring deserved at-
tention to the existing problem and accelerate the enactment of a "human
rights exception" to FSIA, which would deprive a nation of sovereign im-
munity for gross human rights violations.115
VII. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC COURTS
A. International Law and the Interpretation of Statutes
In view of the specific allegations of torture in Nelson, two important
points should be noted. First, under international law, torture is included
among a state's erga omnes duties; that is, torture is a matter of concern for
all states. 116 Torture is expressly condemned by Article 5 of the Universal
Declaration' and the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (reviewing general exceptions to the jurisdictional immuni-
ties of a foreign state).
114. See 18 U.S.C. § 3662 (2002), as amended by 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (listing when a
foreign state is not immune from jurisdiction). Currently, the terrorism list consists of Cuba,
Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. See generally David J. Bederman, Problems
of Proving International Human Rights Law in the U.S. Courts: Dead Man's Hand: Reshuf-
fling Foreign Sovereign Immunities in U.S. Human Rights Litigation, 25 GA. J. INT'L &
Comp. L. 255 (1995) (discussing Alien Tort Claims Act's effect on FSIA).
115. See Mathias Reimann, A Human Rights Exception to Sovereign Immunity: Some
Thoughts on Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 403 (1995). Dis-
cussing the human rights exception, Reimann .noted:
It is time to deny immunity to foreign sovereigns for torture, genocide, or en-
slavement, at least when they are sued by Americans in American courts. Such a
denial would be consonant with two developments that have marked international
law since World War 11: the restriction of sovereign immunity and the expansion
of human rights protection.
Id. at 406. See also Michelle Fastiggi, Note, International Law-The Doctrine of Sovereign
Immunity-A Jurisdictional Shield for Foreign Nations and Their Accountability for Human
Rights Violations, Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S.Ct. 1471 (1993), 12 DICK. J. INT'L L. 387,
390-92 (1994) (discussing the American concept of sovereign immunity).
116. See Philip S. Wellman, Human Rights, International Law, and the Federal Courts,
7 CONN. J. INT'L L. 181, 216 n.129 (1991). In Wellman's review of KENNETH C. RANDALL,
FEDERAL COURT AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PARADIGM (1990), he concludes
with Randall's vision of "an international legal system working beyond the traditional West-
phalian boundaries and protecting all individual victims of terrorist acts and human rights
violations." Id. at 217.
117. See Universal Declaration, supra note I, art. 5. Article 5 states: "No one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Id.
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Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment." 8 These duties are
well-recognized peremptory norms under the doctrine of jus cogens," 9
which binds all nations under international law. Indeed, Article 53 of the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines jus cogens as a "peremptory
norm of general international law" from which no derogation is permitted. 2
Furthermore, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States section 702 refers to the "core group of fundamental norms"
by stating that a state which "practices, encourages, or condones" the follow-
ing is in violation of international law: (a) genocide, (b) slavery, (c) the mur-
der or causing the disappearance of individuals, or (d) torture or other cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. 121
The second point is the relevance of international legal norms and prin-
ciples in interpreting domestic statutes. As stated in a Committee Report of
the Section of International Law of the American Bar Association, "interna-
tional legal norms may find their way into United States law.., when incor-
porated by reference in statutes or by private parties in their dealings inter
se, or when used by courts to inform the content of otherwise ambiguous
Constitutional or statutory provisions."'22 Therefore, in a case where there
are doubts as to the meaning of a particular statutory provision, it is appro-
priate to be informed of the applicable "international legal norm.' '1 23
Quite apart from the views of those who strongly assert that no nation
can claim sovereign immunity when it commits gross human rights viola-
tions,"2 there were hopes that FSIA would be interpreted more in keeping
118. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc.
A/39/51 (1984). Part 1, Article 2 states:
Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other
measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.
No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of
war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as
a justification of torture.
Id.
119. Wellman, supra note 116, at 216 n.130 (definingjus cogens as "fundamental norms
from which ... states may not deviate"). Jus cogens has also been likened to "a world public
order not exclusively controlled by nation-states, one that ... guard[s] the most fundamental
and highly-valued interests of international society." Gordon A. Christenson, Jus Cogens:
Guarding Interests Fundamental to International Society, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 585, 587 (1988).
120. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969).
121. RESTATEMENT, supra note 57, § 702. See also Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C.
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1121 (1995) (discussing howjus cogens may be violated).
122. See Judicial Education on International Law Committee of the Section of Interna-
tional Law of the American Bar Association: Final Report, 24 INT'L LAW. 903, 914 (1990)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter Final Report].
123. Id.
124. See Jordan J. Paust, Federal Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism
and Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International Law Under the FSIA and the Act of
18
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with the clearly expressed Congressional intent. 25 Congress enacted FSIA
for two broad purposes: to codify the restrictive theory of sovereign immu-
nity, and to transfer the responsibility of determining the applicability of
sovereign immunity in specific cases from the executive to the judicial
branch. 126 The "Findings and Declaration of Purpose" expressly stated, "de-
cisions on claims by foreign states to sovereign immunity are best made by
the judiciary on the basis of a statutory regime which incorporates standards
recognized under international law."' 27 It continued:
Although the general concept of sovereign immunity appears to be recog-
nized in international law, its specific content and application have gener-
ally been left to the courts of individual nations. There is, however, a wide
acceptance of the so-called restrictive theory of sovereign immunity; that
is, that the sovereign immunity of foreign states should be "restricted" to
cases involving acts of a foreign state which are sovereign or governmen-
tal in nature as opposed to acts which are either commercial in nature or
those which private persons normally perform.
128
In signing the legislation, President Ford stated:
This statute will also make it easier for our citizens and foreign govern-
ments to turn to the courts to resolve ordinary legal disputes. In this re-
spect, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act carries forward a modern and
enlightened trend in international law. And it makes this development in
the law available to all American citizens.
129
State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191, 220-25 (1983). Those acts which deprive foreign states
and individuals of immunity include human rights violations, genocide, and international ter-
rorism. Id. at 223-25. Paust states that even violations of international law that occur entirely
within a state's territorial boundaries "are not immune to responsive action by or on behalf of
the international community." Id. at 221-22. He further notes that the very notion of sover-
eignty is contingent upon obedience to, and respect for, international law. See also Jordan J.
Paust, Draft Brief Concerning Claims to Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Human Rights:
Nonimmunity for Violators of International Law Under the FSIA, 8 Hous. J. INT'L L. 49, 59
(1985) (stating that the "cloak of sovereignty ends when international law begins").
125. See Joan Fitzpatrick, Reducing the FSIA Barrier to Human Rights Litigation-Is
Amendment Necessary and Possible?, 86 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 338, 344 (1992) (stating
that the impetus for the passage of FSIA was to transfer sovereign immunity issues from the
Executive to the Judiciary and to prevent inconsistencies).
126. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 6-7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. (90
Stat.) 6604, 6604-06.
127. Id. § 1602, at 6613 (emphasis added). In the case of Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
199 (1796), Justice Wilson stated that "[w]hen the United States declared their independence,
they were bound to receive the law of nations, in its modem state of purity and refinement."
Id. at 281. See also BLACKSTONE, supra note 57 (noting that the law of nations is adopted by
common law); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815) (stating that the law of na-
tions is law of the land).
128. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487 § 1602, at 14.
129. Robert B. von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'LL. 33, 33 (1978) (quoting President Ford).
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Under the "modem and enlightened trend" in commercial matters, re-
ferred to by the President as "ordinary legal disputes," a foreign sovereign no
longer enjoyed sovereign immunity. 30 Although the meaning of "commer-
cial activity" was to be resolved by the courts, the statutory intent was to in-
clude:
a broad spectrum of endeavor, from an individual commercial transaction
or act to a regular course of commercial conduct .... Certainly, if an activ-
ity is customarily carried on for profit, its commercial nature could readily
be assumed. At the other end of the spectrum, a single contract, if of the
same character as a contract which might be made by a private person,
could constitute a 'particular transaction or act.'
131
House Report 94-1487 clearly envisaged that the courts would have
considerable "latitude" in determining what constituted commercial activity
and thought it "unwise to attempt an excessively precise definition of this
term, even if that were practicable."'1 32
B. Princz v. Republic of Germany and a "Human Rights Exception"
to the FSIA
Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany,133 a case not decided by the Su-
preme Court, is nevertheless a case of egregious human rights violations
with a thorough discussion of FSIA and the doctrine of jus cogens.'34 In
Princz, the plaintiff, an American citizen holocaust survivor, sued in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia for being impris-
oned and "enslaved" by the Nazi German government. The District Court, in
a bold and comprehensive opinion, held that the defendant, a successor na-
tion to Nazi Germany, could not invoke sovereign immunity by, in effect,
applying a "human rights violation" exception to the FSIA. 135
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit rejected the arguments for a human rights exception to the
FSIA and reversed the decision.'36 Although the Supreme Court denied cer-
tiorari,'37 the majority and minority opinions of the Court of Appeals de-
serve careful consideration for their valuable treatment of the doctrines of
erga omnes, jus cogens, and the elusive "human rights exception" to the
FSIA. Writing for the majority, Circuit Court Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg' 38
130. Id. at 33 (commenting on the "restrictive doctrine" of foreign immunity).
131. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487 § 1063, at 16.
132. Id.
133. 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
134. See id. at 1173-74 (discussing the doctrine ofjus cogens).
135. Princz v. F.R.G., 813 F. Supp. 22, 27 (D.D.C. 1992).
136. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1175.
137. Princz v. F.R.G., 513 U.S. 1121 (1995).
138. Justice Ginsburg took her seat on the U.S. Supreme Court on August 10, 1993.
20
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 33, No. 2 [2003], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol33/iss2/2
THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
held that FSIA granted the defendant sovereign immunity and, because no
statutory exception applied, the District Court had no jurisdiction over the
defendant. Judge Ginsburg noted that FSIA "provides the sole basis for ob-
taining jurisdiction over a foreign state in federal court" '139 and that a foreign
government is immune from the "courts of the United States and of the
States" unless a statutory exception applies, or the United States is a signa-
tory to a controlling international agreement."'l As for the "commercial ac-
tivity" exception, Judge Ginsburg noted that it was limited to "either a regu-
lar course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or
act" '141 and that the activity in question did not have a "direct effect in the
United States.
142
The court defined jus cogens as a principle of international law that is
"accepted by the international community of States as a whole as a norm
from which no derogation is permitted,' ' 143 and that it "prevailfed] over and
invalidat[ed] international agreements and other rules of international law in
conflict with them."'" Nevertheless, the majority concluded that the "fact
that there has been a violation of jus cogens does not confer jurisdiction un-
der the FSIA' ' 145 because a nation has not waived its sovereign immunity
"without strong evidence that this is what the foreign state intended." '146 The
court stated that an "implied waiver depends upon the foreign government's
having at some point indicated its amenability to suit."' 47 Hence, the court
concluded that it had "no warrant ... for holding that the violation of jus co-
gens norms by the Third Reich constitut[ed] an implied waiver of sovereign
immunity under the FSIA."' 4s
Circuit Judge Patricia M. Wald dissented, finding that "Germany's
treatment of Princz violated jus cogens norms of the law of nations,"'49 and
that by engaging in such "barbaric conduct,"' 5 ° Germany implicitly waived
139. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1169 (citing Arg. Rep. v. Amerada Hess Shipping, 488 U.S. 428,
439 (1989)).
140. Id. at 1171. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2002) (stating that a "foreign state shall be
immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States" except in limited circum-
stances); Amerada Hess Shipping, 488 U.S. at 434 (recognizing FSIA as the sole basis forjurisdiction over foreign sovereign in United States courts).
141. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1171-72 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (2002)).
142. Id. at 1173.
143. Id. (quoting Comm. of U.S. Citizens in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (internal citation omitted)).
144. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 57, § 102 cmt. k).
145. .d. at 1174 (quoting Siderman de Blake v. Rep. of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 719 (9th Cir.
1992)).
146. Id. (quoting Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 905 F.2d 438, 444
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (internal citation and quotation omitted)).
147. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1174.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1178.
150. Id. at 1179.
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its immunity from suit within the meaning of Section 1605(a)(1) of FSIA.
Judge Wald concluded that:
in the absence of any indication that Congress intended to exclude from
the scope of Section 1605(a)(1) the concept that a foreign state waives its
immunity by breaching a peremptory norm of international law, . . . the
only way to interpret the FSIA in accordance with international law is to
construe the Act to encompass an implied waiver exception for jus cogens
violations. 151
VIII. STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM EXCEPTION TO THE FSIA
A. Recent Judicial Decisions
Several provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
currently establishes an anti-terrorism exception to the FSIA.'52 Specifically,
the Flatow Amendment,153 which provides a cause of action against officials,
employees, and agents of nations designated as state sponsors of terrorism,
has been the most successful means for victims of human rights violations to
obtain judgments against foreign governments and their instrumentalities. In
the few cases where a foreign government contested the action, constitu-
tional challenges to the anti-terrorism exception have been unsuccessful. For
example, Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Jamahiriya,154 Price v. Socialist
People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,155 and Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq56
each withstood several constitutional challenges. These cases included the
following holdings: Congress had the power to grant subject matter jurisdic-
tion; 157 the exception did not violate the separation of powers doctrine; 5 ' the
classification of countries as sponsors or terrorism did not violate equal
protection 59 or due process rights; 6 ' and the anti-terrorism exception was
not an impermissible ex post facto law. 6 '
151. Id. at 1184-85.
152. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §
221(a), 110 Stat. 1214 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(7)).
153. Flatow Amendment, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 101(c), 110 Stat. 3009-172 (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1996)). The Flatow Amendment was passed as a rider to an appropriations
bill. See Civil Liability for Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 589,
110 Stat. 3009, 3172 (1996).
154. 995 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. N.Y.), aff'd in part, dismissed in part, 162 F.3d 748 (2d Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1003 (1998).
155. 110 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2000), rev'd in part, 294 F.3d 82 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
156. 97 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2000).
157. Price, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 13.
158. Daliberti, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 49; Price, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 13-14.
159. Daliberti, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 52.
160. Rein, 995 F. Supp. at 330-31; Price, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 14-15.
161. Rein, 995 F. Supp. at 331.
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Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba1 62 was the first case to rely on the new
anti-terrorism exception of FSIA to secure a large damage judgment against
a state other than Iran. This case arose from a well-publicized incident in
which two civilian aircrafts searching for rafters in international waters of
the Florida Straits were shot down by the Cuban Air Force, killing four oc-
cupants. 163 Representatives of three of the deceased (two pilots and one pas-
senger), all American citizens, later filed suit against both the Republic of
Cuba and the Cuban Air Force. 64 The court held that the deaths of the occu-
pants constituted an extrajudicial killing within the meaning of the statute, 65
and awarded $187,627,911 in compensatory and punitive damages. 166
A majority of the actions subsequently brought under the anti-terrorism
exception have been against Iran. One such case involved a 1985 "hos-
tage-taking" in Beirut, Lebanon, carried out by Iranian-supported terrorist
groups. In Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran,167 the court held that the
ten-year statute of limitations under the Act was tolled while Iran was im-
mune from suit under the limitations of actions provision of FSIA, which
provided that "[a]ll principles of equitable tolling, including the period dur-
ing which the foreign state was immune from suit ..... ,168 Having estab-
lished Iranian liability, the court then awarded the hostages and their wives a
total of $55,000,000 in compensatory damages.' 69 The Iranian government
and the Ministry of Information and Security (MOIS) were subsequently
held liable in two other Beirut hostage-taking decisions, Anderson v. Islamic
Republic of Iran'70 and Jenco v. Islamic Republic of Iran.'' In both cases,
the court awarded the plaintiffs multi-million dollar compensatory and puni-
tive damage awards.'7 2 Similarly, Iran and the MOIS were also held liable
under the FSIA exception for: their support of a terrorist group that mur-
dered an American serviceman during an airline hijacking in 1985; 1 the po-
litically motivated killing of an Iranian dissident (and naturalized American
citizen) in Paris in 1990;' and, the murder of an American AID official dur-
ing the hijacking of a Kuwait Airlines plane in 1984.'1 Finally, the Iranian
162. 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
163. Alejandre, 996 F. Supp. at 1243-46.
164. One occupant was not a U.S. citizen, and his family could not join the suit. Id. at
1242.
165. Id. at 1248.
166. Id. at 1253.
167. 18 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D.D.C 1998).
168. Id. at 69.
169. Id. at 70.
170. 90 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C. 2000).
171. 154 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 2001).
172. See Anderson, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 114; Jenco, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 35-36.
173. Stethem v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 201 F. Supp. 2d 78, 92-93 (D.D.C. 2002).
174. Elahi v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 124 F. Supp. 2d 97, 114-15 (D.D.C. 2000).
175. Hegna v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, No. 71600 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 2002). See also Neely
Tucker, Iran Loses $42 Million Judgment in Hijack Suit, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2002, at A03.
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government and the MOIS also suffered large damage awards for sponsoring
groups involved in terrorist bombings. Such cases included Americans that
were killed in the suicide bombings of Israeli buses 7 6 and an incident where
an American serviceman was killed by a car bomb at the Beirut Embassy.'
More recently, however, the 1996 death of an American during a terrorist
machine gun attack in Israel resulted in a denial of plaintiff's motion for a
default judgment against Iran on the grounds that there was insufficient evi-
dence to establish Iranian liability.'78
Victims of the 1979 Tehran Embassy takeover, the most recent Iranian
hostage situation, were unsuccessful in obtaining a favorable judgment. In
Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran,'79 the court held that the anti-terrorism
exception did not apply because Iran was not deemed a state sponsor of ter-
rorism as a result of the incident. 80 Furthermore, the exceptions provided by
AEDPA and the Flatow Amendment did not abrogate the Algiers Accords
barring lawsuits arising from the Embassy takeover.'
8
'
In actions against other nations named as state sponsors of terrorism,
plaintiffs have had mixed success. In Daliberti, individuals who were taken
prisoner by Iraqi authorities near the Kuwaiti border were allowed to pro-
ceed with their action for kidnapping, false imprisonment and torture against
the Iraqi government.'82 Similarly, in Price, a case arising from a 1980 inci-
dent where two Americans were charged with illegally taking photographs
and imprisoned for 105 days, plaintiffs were allowed to proceed with an ac-
tion against the Libyan government for hostage taking and torture. The Price
plaintiffs, however, were ultimately unsuccessful: the court held that allega-
tions that the American were "kicked, clubbed and beaten" 183 did not qualify
as "torture" so as to provide jurisdiction under the FSIA exception,'84 and
that their imprisonment did not qualify as "hostage taking" under the excep-
tion.8 5
Although numerous plaintiffs have successfully utilized the FSIA terror-
ism exception to win default judgments against Cuba and Iran, they were un-
176. See Flatow v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 999 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1998); Eisenfeld v. Is-
lamic Rep. of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2000); Weinstein v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 184
F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 2002).
177. Wagner v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 128 (D.D.C. 2001).
178. Ungar v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 211 F. Supp. 2d 91 (D.D.C. 2002). For Ungar's ac-
tion against the Palestinian Authority, the Palestine Liberation Authority, and various individ-
ual defendants, see Ungar v. Palestinian Authority, 151 F. Supp. 2d 76, 100 (D. R.I. 2001)
(finding jurisdiction over the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization,
but not the individual defendants).
179. 195 F. Supp. 2d 140 (D.D.C. 2002).
180. Id. at 160.
181. Id. at 166-69.
182. See Daliberti, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38.
183. Id. at 86.
184. Id. at 94.
185. Id. at 94-95.
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able to enforce the judgments in court. For example, in Alejandre, the plain-
tiff's efforts to attach funds owed to the Cuban telecommunications com-
pany failed when the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the company was a separate
juridical entity. 18 6
Plaintiffs' difficulties in enforcing judgments obtained in these cases are
best illustrated by the Flatow case. In Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran ,187
Alisa Flatow, a United States citizen on a foreign study program in Israel,
was killed on April 9, 1995 when a suicide bomber attacked a tourist bus in
the Gaza Strip. 88 In 1996, Congress enacted amendments to FSIA as part of
the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which granted subject
matter jurisdiction over a claim brought against the foreign state. 189 Based on
these amendments, the estate of Alisa Flatow filed for wrongful death and
related causes of action against the Iranian government. 90 On March 3,
1998, the plaintiff obtained a default judgment against the defendants, and
the United States District Court entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff
in an amount exceeding $247 million. 9' Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced
enforcement proceedings throughout the country against assets allegedly
owned by the Iranian government. 192 However, the plaintiff was unable to
convince the courts to interpret FSIA in a manner that would permit them to
enforce the judgments against Iran.' 93 The estate of Alisa Flatow, which won
$20 million in compensatory damages and $225 million in punitive dam-
ages, has been unable to successfully attach any Iranian assets. 194 The
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal ordered the United States to transfer
three Iranian diplomatic properties and Iran's Foreign Military Sales Ac-
count to Iran.' 95 Each of these attempts were unsuccessful when, in succes-
sive decisions, the District Court for the District of Columbia held that: (1)
the terrorism exception to the FSIA did not authorize the attachment of funds
owed to Iran by the United States;' 96 (2) Iranian embassy property was not
subject to writs of attachment;' 97 and (3) because Iranian Foreign Military
186. Alejandre v. Telefonica Larga Distancia de Puerto Rico, Inc., 183 F.3d 1277, 1287
( lIth Cir. 1999).
187. 999 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1998).
188. Id. at 7.
189. Id. at 12.
190. Id. at 6.
191. Id. at 5 (detailing the factual background in the underlying the Flatow case).
192. Flatow v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 1999).
193. Id. at 27-28. See generally Jonathan Fischbach, Note, The Empty Pot at the End of
the Rainbow: Confronting "Hollow-Rights Legislation" After Flatow, 87 CORNELL L. REV.
1001 (2002). As of the writing of this article, no victims have been able to collect on the
judgments. Id. at 1009 (citing letter from Senators Connie Mack and Frank Lautenberg to
Members of the Senate (Oct. 15, 1999)).
194. Fischbach, supra note 193, at 1008-09.
195. Id.
196. Flatow v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 74 F. Supp. 2d 18, 25-26 (D.D.C. 1999).
197. Flatow, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 27-28.
25
Re: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Effective Remedies and
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2003
162 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33
Sales Account funds were held by the United States Treasury, the writ of at-
tachment was a suit against the United States government and thus barred by
sovereign immunity absent an explicit waiver.'98 The plaintiff in Flatow also
failed to attach the assets of a non-profit Iranian foundation,' 99 and continued
efforts to obtain United States government assistance in locating Iranian as-
sets were ultimately unsuccessful. °°
B. New Legislation
Given the fact that current legislation has failed to enable victims of
human rights violations in foreign territories to obtain adequate redress, one
solution is to enact new legislation designed to broaden the jurisdiction of
American courts in the area of human rights violations. Since 1997, how-
ever, there has been little activity in expanding the sovereign immunity ex-
ception. Aside from several technical and minor amendments to §
1605(a)(7),2 ' unsuccessful bills were introduced during the 105th Congress
that would have extended the exception to cover instances, such as, when
states have no extradition treaty with the United States at the time the act in
question occurred, or when no adequate available remedies conformed with
fundamental fairness and due process.20 2
Instead of broadening the scope of § 1605(a)(7), the most notable legis-
lative amendment focused on a prevailing party's inability to actually collect
damages following a favorable judgment. These enactments consisted of a
series of laws aimed at enabling successful plaintiffs to attach the assets of
nations sponsoring terrorism. The first such legislation was passed as a rider
to the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Act of 1999, which added § 1610(f)(1)(A) to FSIA.2 °3 This section, however,
included a provision allowing the President to waive this section in the inter-
ests of national security.2 °4 Thus, on the same day that President Clinton
198. Flatow v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, No. 97-396 (RCL), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8910, at
*8-9 (D.D.C. June 6, 2000).
199. See Flatow v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 67 F. Supp. 2d 535 (D. Md. 1999), aft'd, Flatow
v. Alavi Found., 225 F.3d 653 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision).
200. See Flatow v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 202 F.R.D. 35 (D.D.C. 2001).
201. See Pub. L. No. 105-11, 111 Stat. 22 (1997) (substituting "neither the claimant nor
the victim was" for "the claimant or victim was not"); Pub. L. No. 107-77, § 626(c), 115 Stat.
748, 803 (2001) (inserting before the semi-colon at the end "or the act is related to Case
Number 1:00CV031 10 (ESG) in the United States Court for the District of Columbia"); Pub.
L. No. 107-117, Div. B, § 208, 115 Stat. 2230, 2299 (2002) (striking out 1:00CV03110 (ESG)
and substituting 1:00CV03 11 0(EGS)).
202. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Technical Corrections Act of 1997, S. 1302, 105th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(7)(B)(ii) (1997); Foreign Sovereign Immunity Technical Corrections
Act of 1998, H.R. 3848, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a) (1998).
203. See Fischbach, supra note 193, at 1020-21 (citing Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 117(a), 112
Stat. 2681, 2681-491 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f)(1)(A) (1999)).
204. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f)(2)(B)(3) (2002).
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signed the Act, he waived the plaintiffs' rights to attach blocked assets.2°5
Following the Clinton waiver, there were rumors that the administration of-
fered to pay part of the Flatow judgment from a victim's compensation
fund.20 6 The Treasury Department suggested that judgments could be satis-
fied from the Crime Victims Fund.20 7
The next attempt to assist plaintiffs in satisfying judgments was the Vic-
tims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, which provided for
compensation to a narrowly defined group of victims of terrorism sponsored
by Cuba and Iran.208 For Iran, the awards for compensatory damages were to
be paid from $400 million in frozen Iranian assets, including rental proceeds
from Iranian diplomatic and consular property, and "funds not otherwise
made available in an amount not to exceed the total of the amount in the Iran
Foreign Military Sales Program. .- 20' Although this legislation has permit-
ted five plaintiffs to collect over $300 million in awards, it has been criti-
cized because the funds are being paid by the United States with little chance
of recovery from Iran. 210 Furthermore, because the Act also excluded plain-
tiffs whose situations differed little, if at all, from those who have been in-
cluded, it has also recently been criticized by United States District Court
Judge Henry H. Kennedy as "'illogical and inconsistent' and the 'result of
poor statutory drafting.' "211
The latest congressional effort aimed at allowing plaintiffs to satisfy
judgments from the frozen assets of terrorists, terrorist organizations, and
state sponsors of terrorism is contained in section 11 of the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act of 2002.212 The Act exempts certain properties, subject to the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or the Vienna Convention on
205. Determination to Waive Requirements Relating to Blocked Property of Terrorist-
List States, Presidential Determination No. 99-1, 63 Fed. Reg. 59201 (Oct. 21, 1998), re-
printed in 28 U.S.C. § 1610 note (2002).
206. Fischbach, supra note 193, at 1025.
207. Id. at 1026 (citing Terrorism: Victims' Access to Terrorist Assets: Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong., at 16 (statement of Sen. Frank R. Lauten-
berg)).
208. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, §
2002(a)(2)(A), 114 Stat. 1464, 1541 (2000).
209. Id. § 2002(b)(2).
210. Richard M. Mosk, Compensating Victims: Costly, Unfair, Perilous, NEWSDAY,
Aug. 23, 2002, at A36 (the author is an associate justice of the California Court of Appeal and
a former judge of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal).
211. Neely Tucker, Judge Asks Hill to Overturn Law on Compensation, WASH. POST,
Aug. 9, 2002, at A21. In Hegna v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, No. 71600 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 2000),
Judge Kennedy awarded the plaintiff $42 million in damages only to later rule that there
could be no recovery because she was not eligible under the Act.
212. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, H.R. 3210, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002).
[hereinafter Terrorism Risk Insurance Act]. On June 10, 2002, this bill passed the Senate with
an amendment. For the Senate version of the bill, see Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002,
S. 2600, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002). For similar legislations, see Terrorism Victim's Access
to Compensation Act of 2002, S. 2134, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002); Justice for Victims of
Terrorism Act of 2002, H.R. 4647, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002).
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Consular Relations, and provides that presidential waiver does not apply to
property used by the United States for any non-diplomatic purposes.213 The
bill also includes a special rule for cases against Iran with respect to distribu-
tion of foreign military sales funds where properties were inadequate to sat-
isfy the amount of compensatory awards against Iran.214 The bill has now
passed both the House and Senate, and has been sent to a conference com-
mittee.215 With regard to Iran, it also expands the coverage of the Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act by making the law applicable to
suits filed on or before October 28, 2000.216 Like past legislations, it is con-
troversial-some opponents claim that it will "subject the United States to
retaliation and financial exposure, impair the president's ability to enter into
agreements and treaties, and leave important foreign policy matters in the
hands of tort plaintiffs and their lawyers....217
C. Violations of Jus Cogens
Plaintiffs seeking redress for a nation's violation of jus cogens have
been unsuccessful since Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, when the
District of Columbia Circuit rejected the argument that violation of these
norms constituted an implied waiver of sovereign immunity. 218 No such
waiver was found in several Holocaust-related actions, including one
brought by a former concentration camp slave laborer;219 another seeking
reparations under the 1952 Luxembourg Agreement between Germany and
Israel z;22 and a third on behalf of Jews transported to Nazi death camps by
the French national railroad company. 21 Other cases that rejected an implied
waiver include: an action against Libya arising from the Pan American
Flight 103 bombing; 222 a suit against Japan by Koreans forced into sexual
slavery as part of the Imperial Japanese Army's "comfort women" pro-
gram;223 and an action against Yugoslavia brought by victims of ethnic
cleansing in Kosovo.2 24
213. H.R. 3210, §§ ll(b)(1)-I1(b)(2)(A) (2002).
214. Id. § Il (d)(1)(A).
215. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, supra note 212.
216. Id. § 1 l(c)(1).
217. Mosk, supra note 210, at A36.
218. See Princz, 26 F.3d at 1166.
219. Sampson v. F.R.G., 250 F.3d 1145 (7th Cir. 2001).
220. Hirsh v. Israel, 962 F. Supp. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
221. Abrams v. Socift6 Nationale des Chemins de Fer Franqais, 175 F. Supp. 2d 423
(E.D.N.Y. 2001).
222. Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1204 (1997).
223. Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 172 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.C. 2001).
224. Boshnjaku v. Fed. Rep. of Yugo., No. 01 C 4608, 2002 WL 1575067 (N.D. 111. July
18, 2002).
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D. Commercial Activity Exception to the FSIA
Since the Supreme Court's narrow construction of the "commercial ac-
tivity" exception to FSIA in Nelson, which held that plaintiffs arrest, im-
prisonment and torture was an abuse of the Saudi government's police power
and unrelated to commercial activity,225 other plaintiffs seeking to utilize the
exception have also been unsuccessful. The Nelson rationale has since been
followed in other cases where human rights abuses occurred in connection
with a commercial activity. Such cases include Doe v. Unocal Corp.,226
where abuses were committed by the Burmese government during a joint-
venture pipeline construction project involving an American oil company, 227
and Bao Ge v. Li Peng,22 8 where Chinese citizens were allegedly compelled
to perform forced prison labor in manufacturing soccer balls.229 In both in-
stances, the court held that the abuses complained of involved an exercise of
sovereign police powers and refused to apply the commercial activity excep-
tion.230
Similarly, in Daliberti, where the spouses of the kidnap victims brought
an action against Iraq under the commercial activity exception, the court, cit-
ing Nelson, held that Iraqi actions were an exercise of its sovereign powers
and "not the kind of powers exercised by private citizens.2 31 The court also
refused to take a broad view of commercial activity, holding that while Iraqi
funding of terrorist activities might arguably be a commercial activity, the
acts committed in Iraq that directly affected the plaintiffs' spouses had "no
connection with a commercial activity. 2 32
Attempts to apply a broader view of the commercial activity exception
in World War II-related actions have also been unsuccessful. For example,
courts have rejected the following attempts to characterize as commercial ac-
tivity: Japan's "comfort women" program;233 the French national railway's
transportation of Jews to Nazi death camps;234 and Germany's establishment
of reparation fund programs for Holocaust survivors.235 The most recent un-
successful attempt to apply the commercial activity exception to human
rights abuses was in Boshnajaku v. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.236 Here,
the plaintiffs maintained that Yugoslavia had obtained a commercial benefit
225. Nelson, 507 U.S. at 363.
226. 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 2002 WL 31063976
(9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002), reh'g en banc granted, 2003 WL 359787 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2003).
227. Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 887-88.
228. 201 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2000).
229. Id. at 23-24.
230. Id.; Doe, 2002 WL 31063976, at *17-19.
231. Daliberti, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 47.
232. Id.
233. Hwang Geum Joo, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 61-64.
234. Abrams, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 429-30.
235. Wolf v. F.R.G., 95 F.3d 536, 543-44 (7th Cir. 1996).
236. No. 01 C 4608, 2002 WL 1575067 (N.D. I11. Jul. 18, 2002).
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from expelling Albanians, who then sought refuge in the United States.237
The court, however, looked at the inherent nature of the acts and determined
that the killings, assaults and expulsions carried out by Yugoslavia in no way
fit any definition of commercial activity.238
E. Torture Victim Protection Act
The potential scope of the TVPA was expanded in Doe I v. Islamic Sal-
vation Front,239 where a court held that state action requirements of the Act
did not require the government involved be officially recognized, and that
groups constituting a de facto state may be held liable under the Act.2"
However, the limitations of TPVA as a means of redress for human rights
violations have been amply demonstrated in several subsequent cases. The
only successful effort, Estate of Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios,241 was di-
rected against an individual Chilean soldier-not the Chilean government.
An attempt to use the TVPA against a corporation in Beanal v. Free-
port-McMoRan,242 however, was unsuccessful. Here, a member of the
Amunge tribe of Indonesian-ruled Irian Jaya (western New Guinea) brought
an action for human rights abuses against American corporations whose sub-
sidiary was operating open-pit gold, silver and copper mines.243 Noting that
the TVPA holds only "individuals" liable, which generally does not apply to
corporations, the court determined that a corporation could not be held liable
under the Act.2" Finally, in Tachiona v. Mugabe,245 opponents of President
Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe brought an action alleging "murder, torture,
terrorism, rape, beatings and destruction of property. '246 In ruling for Mug-
abe, the court noted that the TPVA did not "negate head-of-state immu-
nity." 247
IX. THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS
What is the role of United States courts-particularly, the Supreme
Court-in the interpretation of statutes that embody international law and in-
ternational legal norms? On this question, an observation in an ABA Com-
237. Id. at *3.
238. Id.
239. 993 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1998).
240. Id. at 9 (citing Kadi6, 70 F.3d at 244). The court did not determine whether the Is-
lamic Salvation Front did, in fact, constitute a de facto state. Id.
241. 157 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
242. 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
243. Id. at 163.
244. Id. at 168-69.
245. 169 F. Supp. 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
246. Id. at 265.
247. ld. at 297.
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mittee Report on Judicial Education on International Law is particularly per-
tinent. The Report states:
[T]he applicability of international legal norms in specific cases may be,
and frequently is, limited by the considerations of jurisdiction, equity and
due process that bear upon all proceedings before U.S. courts. A decent
respect for the opinions of mankind, however, as well as for our own judi-
cial traditions, demands that such considerations not be invoked merely to
disguise an unwillingness to accord international legal norms their rightful
place in our legal system.
248
In Nelson, the question was whether the court was reasonable to inter-
pret and apply FSIA in keeping with the restrictive theory of sovereign im-
munity and in accordance with principles of international law that condemn
torture. Specifically, the court determined the issue of whether the alleged
acts of torture were "peculiarly sovereign in nature," or whether plaintiff's
cause of action was based upon the "commercial activity" of operating a
hospital .249
Assuming doubts as to the meaning of a particular section of FSIA,
could the court not "be informed" by the international law norm that con-
demns torture? 250 Was it possible to adhere to Chief Justice Marshall's guid-
ance that an "act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law
of nations if any other possible construction remains? '251 It was clear that the
specific purposes of FSIA were to adopt the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity-"a modem and enlightened trend in international law" 252 -and
have decisions on claims of sovereign immunity made by the "judiciary on
the basis of a statutory regime which incorporates standards recognized un-
der international law. 253 Surely, it would be disheartening to conclude that
248. Final Report, supra note 122, at 914-15.
249. Nelson, 507 U.S. at 360-61. The Supreme Court stated that "a foreign state's exer-
cise of the power of its police has long been understood" as being unique to sovereigns, re-
gardless of how "monstrous such abuse undoubtedly may be." Id. at 361. See generally Scott
J. Graves, Comment, Jurisdiction-Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act-Using the "Nexus
Test" to Find Jurisdiction Over Foreign Sovereigns, Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528
(11th Cir. 1991), 16 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 333 (1992) (analyzing whether FSIA
granted Saudi Arabia subject matter jurisdiction in Neslon); Robert H. Wood, Saudi Arabia v.
Nelson: Roll Over Weltover, Tell Scott Nelson the News, 2 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 175, 186
(1994) (criticizing Justice Souter's disposition of Nelson's intentional tort claims).
250. See Final Report, supra note 122, at 907-08 (indicating that "[i]ntemational legal
norms may find their way into United States law ... when used by courts to inform the con-
tent of otherwise ambiguous Constitutional or statutory provisions.").
251. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). Chief
Justice Marshall reaffirmed this position in 1815, holding that until an act of Congress has
passed "the Court is bound by the law of nations which is a part of the law of the land." The
Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 423. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 57, § 114 & Re-
porter's Note 2; PAUST, supra note 57, at 107-08.
252. von Mehren, supra note 129, at 33 (noting Immunities Act codifies "restrictive doc-
trine of foreign service immunity").
253. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487 § 1602, at 14 (emphasis added).
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a determination was made "merely to disguise an unwillingness to accord
international legal norms their rightful place in our legal system. "254
In discussing the judicial function of the courts of the United States in
interpreting constitutional provisions and statutes, it is essential to remember
the special role of judges as appointed under Article III of the Constitution.
Article III, which confers life tenure and judicial immunity, grants judges a
special status.255 Because federal courts have historically applied interna-
tional law in the adjudication of cases,256 judges might arguably have an
even greater responsibility to exercise their constitutionally granted inde-
pendence in cases involving international human rights.
2 57
X. "A DECENT RESPECT TO THE OPINIONS OF MANKIND"
The doctrine and practice of judicial review have given the American
Constitution and its Bill of Rights the unique status of living documents in
securing the rights of the people against governmental abuse. With rare ex-
ceptions, the Supreme Court has not only given effect and vitality to the ide-
als set forth in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, but has expanded
upon the meaning of life and liberty-words enshrined in those docu-
ments.258
Justice Blackmun, in his thoughtful address, borrowed the phrase "a de-
cent respect to the opinions of mankind" from the first paragraph of the Dec-
laration of Independence.259 He quoted Professor Louis Henkin, who re-
marked that "almost all nations observe almost all principles of international
law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time. '260 Justice
Blackmun added: "[u]nfortunately, ... the Supreme Court's own recent re-
cord in the area is somewhat more qualified. I would say that, at best, the
254. Final Report, supra note 122, at 915.
255. See U.S. CONST. art III, § 1. See generally authorities cited in Edward D. Re, Judi-
cial Independence and Accountability: The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct
and Disability Act of 1980, 8 N. KY. L. REv. 221 (1981).
256. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (noting courts will not tolerate human
fights violations), and supra note 58 and accompanying text (stressing that law of nations is a
part of common law).
257. See Hatfield-Lyon, supra note 78, at 337. "A court that does not meaningfully con-
sider the international human rights obligations of its government is giving a judicial override
to these obligations, thereby violating international law and denying justice." Id. (citation
omitted). Professor Hatfield-Lyon urges American courts to follow the Canadian approach to
international human fights cases and adopt a human fights exception to immunity under the
FSIA. See id. at 334.
258. See Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (entitling Chinese nationals
admitted into the United States to judicial hearings to adjudicate citizenship claims). "[T]he
Fifth Amendment affords protection in its guarantee of due process of law," to those faced
with "loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth living." Id. at 284-85.
259. Blackmun, supra note 58, at 383 (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
para. 1).
260. Id. at 387 (quoting Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979)).
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present Supreme Court enforces some principles of international law and
some of its obligations some of the time. '
261
Justice Blackmun concluded by stating that during his thirty-four years
of service on the federal bench:
[T]he United States has become economically and politically intertwined
with the rest of the world as never before. International human rights con-
ventions-still a relatively new idea when I came to the bench in 1959-
have created for nations mutual obligations that are accepted throughout
the world. As we approach the 100th anniversary of The Paquette Ha-
bana... it perhaps is appropriate to remind ourselves that now, more than
ever, "international law is part of our law" and is entitled to the respect of
U.S. domestic courts. Although the recent decisions of the Supreme Court
do not offer much hope for the immediate future, I look forward to the day
when the Supreme Court, too, will inform its opinions almost all the time
with a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.262
XI. CONCLUSION
From the dawn of civilization, idealists and humanists have dreamed of
achieving fundamental human rights. For Americans, the monumental mile-
stones have been the Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, and the
Constitution. To this renowned roster must be added the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, and covenants, which embody fundamental principles
that today comprise of an impressive body of international law on human
rights.
On December 10, 1998, the international community celebrated the
Golden Anniversary of the enactment of the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights. The celebration provided an opportunity to express gratitude to
those who made possible its adoption, and to those who continue to work to
make its ideals and fundamental freedoms a reality. In 1993, at a symposium
on "Human Rights Before the Domestic Courts," in Concluding Remarks
entitled "Human Rights, Domestic Courts and Effective Remedies," it was
stated that our topic
has dealt with human rights, but not merely as ideals, or goals. We mean
human rights to be realized, and to be vindicated by an effective remedies.
Hence, the question should no longer be whether there is a right not to be
tortured. The question today is: How can the victim obtain an effective
remedy?2
63
261. Id. at 387-88 (emphasis added).
262. Id. at 388 (emphasis added).
263. Edward D. Re, The Judge Edward D. Re Distinguished Lecture Series Symposium
on Human-Rights Before Domestic Courts, Concluding Remarks: Human Rights, Domestic
Courts and Effective Remedies, 67 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 581, 592 (1993).
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To the self-evident truths proclaimed in the American Declaration of
Independence, today, one must add the words of the Universal Declaration
that the "inalienable rights of all members of the human family are the foun-
dation of freedom, justice and peace in the world." '
The celebration served as a reminder that the efforts to fully achieve the
fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Universal Declaration are the respon-
sibility of us all. The greatest responsibility is that of governments and pub-
lic officials whose commitment to human rights must make human rights
concerns relevant in all questions of domestic and foreign policy. That re-
sponsibility will not end until fundamental human rights and freedoms are a
reality enjoyed by the entire human family.
264. See Universal Declaration, supra note 1, at pmbl.
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